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BOOK PANEL DISCUSSION: "THE TWO FACES
OF AMERICAN FREEDOM," BY AZIZ RANA
LOST CAUSES: COMMENT ON AZIZ RANA,
THE TWO FACES OF AMERICAN FREEDOM
Nancy L. Rosenblum*
I. WHAT KIND OF WORK IS THIS? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
II. THE POLITICAL DYNAMIC OF DEMOCRATIC FREEDOM ..... 114
117
III. Two META-OBSERVATIONS: ETHICS AND HISTORY ........
A few months after his defense of the dissertation that became the
superb monograph Two Faces of American Freedom, Aziz Rana sent the
members of his doctorate committee a CD. Here are a few of his
selections:
* Gallows Tree, sung by Odettal
* The Night They Drove Old Dixie Down, sung by The Band 2
* I Ain't Got No Home in This World Anymore, sung by Woody
Guthrie3
* Strange Fruit (about a hanging), sung by Billie Holiday4
* Folsom Prison Blues, sung by Johnny Cash5
The rest of the tracks are in this vein. They are all lugubrious.
They are all written in a minor key; their harmonies layer tears on tears.
They are not about unrequited love, either. They are the moans and
laments of those ground down by turns in American history-slavery,
lynching, civil war, the Great Depression, and homelessness. The
historian Salo W. Baron used to speak of the "lachrymose theory of
Jewish history."6 That description could probably apply to every people
and nation, as long as their historians are not hagiographers.
* Senator Joseph Clark Professor of Ethics in Politics and Government, Harvard
University.
1 ODETTA, Gallows Tree, on AT THE GATE OF HORN (Rykodisc 1997).
2 THE BAND, The Night They Drove Old Dixie Down, on THE BAND (Capital Records

1969).
3 WOODY GUTHRIE, I Ain't Got No Home In This World Anymore, on DUST BowL

BALLADS (RCA Victor 1940).

4

BILLIE HOLIDAY, Strange Fruit, on LADY SINGS THE BLUES (Commodore 1939).
5 JOHNNY CASH, Folsom Prison Blues, on WITH His HOT AND BLUE GUITAR (Sun

Records 1955).
6 David Engel, On Studying Jewish History in Light of the Holocaust, Maurice R. and

Corinne P. Greenberg Memorial Lecture, U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum (Apr. 16, 2001)
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Of course, it is wrong to think that aesthetic and intellectual

sensibilities always match; individuals are not of one piece. This music
cannot be a reflection of Rana's intellectual temper, since he also
exhibits the hopefulness of a progressive democrat. He cannot really
count as a lachrymose historian. 7 He describes himself as an embedded
social critic,8 and it takes more than an iota of optimism, after all, to
think not only about how we got to be the way we are, but also to think
about how we might be better, and to find resources in a damaged pastto find inspiration in lost causes.
We find both faces of the author in The Two Faces of American
Freedom. Rana is explicit about this duality; he will uncloak "both the
tragedy and the hope embedded in social practices and political
disagreements."9
In this comment I propose to do three things. First, I reflect on the
kind of scholarly work this book is-its genre and signature contribution.
Second, I raise a question about the author's implicit and, I argue,
ambiguous theory of the political dynamic of progressive change.
Finally, I conclude with two meta-observations about this challenging
work.
I.

WHAT KIND OF WORK IS THIS?

Two Faces of American Freedom is narrative history-a form once
celebrated but more recently disparaged as "grand historical narrative."
Rana calls his work a "large-scale act of historical reconstruction,"' 0 and
it is just that. There always has been an important strain of American
historical writing that is comprehensive in its narrative arc, such as that
of Charles Beard."I Recently, we have seen a revival of grand narrative
in American history-interestingly among legal scholars like Bruce Ackerman.12 Legal academe has become a premier site of this renewed
ambition.13
(transcript available at http://www.ushmm.org/research/center/publications/occasional/200310/paper.pdf).
7 See Aziz RANA, THE Two FACES OF AMERICAN FREEDOM 4 (2010).
8 Id. at 17.
9 Id. at 7.
10

RANA,

supra note 7, at 3.

I See, e.g.,
12

See

CHARLES BEARD, HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES (1921).
BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991); BRUCE ACKERMAN,

WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS

(1998).

13 I speculate that synthetic narrative history is encouraged by three general turns in legal
academe: (1) from constitutional doctrine to political context; (2) from rights to constitutional
structures and the interaction of courts with other institutions; and (3) from the rise of comparative constitutionalism with its emphasis not just on comparative doctrine, but on institutions
like executive power. We see this, for example, in Rana's reading of Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60
U.S. 393 (1857), or Congressional authority to designate which American territories were dependent colonies. See RANA, supra note 7, at 169, 171, 279, 300.
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Grand narrative histories have several defining characteristics. One
characteristic is the claim that there is a key to history, such as class
conflict.' 4 For Rana, the key to American history is the enduring effect
of the nation's political origin as a "settler empire."' 5 Rana argues that
one should not see settler empire as a period of conquest and subordination in the distant past, but rather as a basic governing framework for
American life for over three centuries.' 6 The key dynamic is the way in
which democratic self-rule emerged entwined with and constrained by
imperial expansion and suppression of outsiders.17
It is characteristic of this type of history to turn the thematic key
into a narrative with arc and drama, punctuated by critical moments. For
Rana, as I read his work, these moments are: (1) populism at the margins
of Jacksonian politics; (2) Radical Republicans at the time of the Civil
War; (3) the last two decades of the nineteenth century and the People's
Party; and (4) the early twentieth century when the United States asserted
itself on the global stage and solidified a new imperial self-understanding. The disintegration of settlerism as a political and constitutional system and the eclipse of its elements of self-rule do not appear to have
similarly critical moments. Instead, increased executive authority and
power, which Rana sees as variations on royal imperial prerogative, mark
the steady disintegration of settlerism.18 However, this disintegration
dramatically culminates in the New Deal reorganization of government
with what Rana depicts as near fatal consequences for self-rule-the creation of an administrative state. 19
It is striking enough to merit comment that a theorist with progressive ambitions portrays the New Deal as a critical falling off from American promise. In emphasizing expansive presidential power and
administrative agencies, Rana is vulnerable to the charge that he has underestimated the forces of inclusion and equality that accompanied active
government and expansive policy. For example, political scientists have
studied key instances in which government agencies and programs have
had the effect of creating politically inspired popular constituencies. 20
Among these constituencies are some of the most broad-based and active
14 See Dorothy Ross, Grand Narrative in American Historical Writing, 100 AM. HIsT.
REv. 651 (1995).
15 See RANA, supra note 7, at 13.
16 See id.
17 See id.
18 See id. at 106-11.
19 See id. at 296-97.
20 See, e.g., ANDREA LOUISE CAMPBELL, How POLICIES MAKE CITIZENs: SENIOR POLITCAL ACTIVISM AND THE AMERICAN WELFARE STATE (2003); SuZANNE METTLER, SOLDIERS TO
CITIZENS: THE G.I. BILL AND THE MAKING OF THE GREATEST GENERATION (2005); THEDA
SKOCPOL, PROTECTING SOLDIERS AND MOTHERS: THE POLITICAL ORIGINS OF SOCIAL POLICY IN
THE UNITED STATES (1992).
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forces in democratic politics today-for example, Social Security and
senior citizens. 2 1 Insofar as they organize in defense of universal benefits and services, their participatory efforts simply are not reducible to
warrant special interest.
Comprehensive narrative history is also marked by drama, with opposing forces of good and evil. The drama takes a particular shape
when, as here, the forces in conflict are presented as inextricably tied
together. Thus, we learn that the unique American ideal of democratic
freedom "entailed" imperial frameworks. 22 We learn that popular mobilization and direct control over political and economic decision-making
"gained strength" from practices of subordination. 23 We learn that
projects of territorial expansion and judgments about who counted as social insiders "generated" accounts of liberty.2 4 As a result, unraveling
the forces can be a monumental political task-not doomed to failure,
but clearly requiring more than the victory of one side over the other. 25
A second characteristic of grand narrative histories is that they are
proudly oppositional. They stand above or astride the standard histories.
Sometimes that is the result of the judgment that standard histories are
simply wrong, and that the errors have damaging consequences. These
histories produce illusion, paralysis, or preservationist impulses, as in the
hagiography of founders that Rana confronts. Alternatively, narrative
history is opposed to standard accounts that are correct in picking out an
essential feature of the story, but misunderstand it. For example, they
might recognize that America is expansionist, but not see America as an
empire, and thus they miss how the United States constitutionalized conquest.2 6 As Rana tells it, historians miss the fact that In re Debs2 7 was an
explicit, domestic application of the imperial prerogative, used to confront industrial strife. 28 Finally, opposition, grand narrative history
claims to repair the fragmented nature of standard histories. They contain pieces of the story, but the threads are not woven into a comprehensive account. For example, American anti-statism is typically seen as
grounded American individualism, so that it appears in a negative, unproductive political light. 29 However, set in the fuller context of
America as a settler empire, Rana sees anti-statism as an episodic attempt
21 See,

e.g., AMERICAN ASSOCIATION

FOR RETIRED PERSONS (AARP), http://

www.aarp.org/ (last visited Sept. 8, 2011).
22
23
24
25
26

See RANA, supra note 7, at 108-11.
Id. at 7.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 107.

27 158 U.S. 564 (1895).
28 See RANA, supra note 7, at 223-25.
29 See e.g., HENRY DAVID THOREAU, THOREAU: POLITICAL WRITINGS (Nancy L. Rosen-

blum ed., 1996).
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at alternative, collective self-government.3 0 This usual negative view is
partial; anti-statism is only negative in its ambition and effect when it
fails.
I want to look more closely at what I see as the main oppositional
threads in Rana's work. Two contrasts with other narrative histories
stand out. First, for roughly forty years, since the 1960s and 1970s, a
"new history" paradigm has been cast in opposition to consensus history-one associated with postwar (and Cold War) confidence in
America's distinctive individualism, democracy, abundance, and in
American politics as a "vital center" between extremes. 3 1 Consensus
history emphasizes continuity. 32 Against this, "new historians" rewrote
the past, and emphasized conflict and the construction of new sub-disciplines on women, African Americans, poverty, racism, sexism, and inequality. They identified new and old lefts, and homegrown radical
traditions.3 3 "New historians" included the Populists in their resurrection
of conflict; the Populists were seen to have a coherent system of radical
thought-a productive alternative to socialism and communism. 34 "New
history" owed something to early twentieth century Progressive historians, with the obvious difference that Progressives "tended to emphasize
progress as the underlying motif of American history" and "new historians" did not.35
My point is that the undoing of consensus history is unfinished business. Recently, Bruce Ackerman has shown that America was revolutionary, once we correctly understand the form it undertook and that,
instead of constitutional continuity and preservation, there were radical
ruptures that amounted to revolutionary regime changes. 36 Rogers
Smith,3 7 to take another example, continues to challenge Louis Hartz on
"Lockean consensus" liberalism.3 8 As Smith argues, racial ascription
and hierarchy are misrepresented as unfinished liberal business; rather,
these were independent anti-liberal strains in American thought and culture.39 Rana continues in this vein. Historians like William Appleman
30 Id. at 103.
31 ELLEN FYIZPATRICK, HISTORY'S MEMORY: WRITING AMERICA'S PAST, 1880-1980,

194-96 (2002).
32 See MORTON KELLER, AMERICA'S THREE REGIMES: A POLITICAL HISTORY (2009), for
an excellent recent example of consensus history.
33 See id.
34 See id.
35 See FITZPATRICK, supra note 31 (emphasis added).
36 See ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS, supra note

12.

37 See ROGERS M. SMrrH, CIVIC IDEALS: CONFLICTING VISIONS OF CrrlZENSHIP IN U.S.
HISTORY (1997).
38 See Louis HARTZ,

THE

LIBERAL TRADITION IN AMERICA: AN INTERPRETATION OF

AMERICAN POLITICAL THOUGHT SINCE THE REVOLUTION (1955).
39 See RANA, supra note 7, at 7; SMITH, supra note 37, at 30-35.
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Williams set American expansionism in the framework of corporatedriven capitalism, and drew connections between external power and internal militarism. 40 Rana reworks and refreshes this counter-narrative
using the framework of settler empire.
A second oppositional element in Rana's history is to correct the
durable idea of American exceptionalism. He does not deny it outright,
but he wants to reshape its basic contours. 4 1 Settler empire is Rana's
original "way in" to the subject of exceptionalism. We can only understand settler empire, he argues, by setting it in the framework of a typology of imperialism and colonialism, and looking at different kinds of
relations between metropole and indigenous peoples. 42 For me, this attention to comparative politics and history is the most original aspect of
the book. I see it as a fruitful extension of several decades of work in
comparative global history, "Atlantic Studies," and studies of imperialism that focus on comparisons across time and global regions.
Specifically, three elements of Rana's account of settler empire are
corrective to the notion of American exceptionalism. First, "[b]efore it
was a place, the New World was an idea." 43 The idea of a place of
plenitude, gold, and spices, like America-but also a place that was
empty, without the disappointments of the Old World or, for that matter,
the disappointment of coming to a promised land that was already inhabited by someone else."4 Rana cautions that this is characteristic of new
world colonization generally, and that there is nothing uniquely American in the fact that the objective was not exploitation, but native elimination and settling. 4 5 Furthermore, America was not exceptional in
establishing greater equality within the settler colony than in the imperial
metropole, or in providing a militaristic response to perceived threats of
indigenous and foreign populations.4 6
Another correction of exceptionalism grows out of careful attention
to the character of the British Empire as it expanded in the 1760s. Rana
documents how Britain reorganized indirect rule as a method of control
in a way that resulted in empowering indigenous elites. 47 He details how
changing legal thinking in Britain-from Coke and Locke, to Mansfield's Somersett decision 4 8-along with British policies of cultural and
religious toleration toward French Canadians, Native Americans, and
40 See WILuAM APPLEMAN Wit-uAMs, TIE CONTOURS OF AMERICAN HISTORY (1989).

41 See RANA, supra note 7, at 5-7.
42 See id. at 12-13.
43 JOHN PIeIaN, WOODSBURNER 64 (2009).

44 See id. at 64-65.
45
46
47
48

See
See
See
See

RANA, supra note 7, at 8-14.
id.
id. at 72.
id. at 43-44, 80, 82-87.
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slaves, threatened autonomous colonial practices. 4 9 From this standpoint, America is not best understood in terms of Hanna Arendt and
Gordon Wood's "new beginning," but as a restoration.5 0 Settler revolt
against changing features of imperial colonization characterized this restoration. 5 1 In particular, Americans objected to the fact that "British efforts to broaden the privileges of subjectship through policies of cultural
and religious toleration entailed a reduction in the actual value of social
inclusion."5 2 In spinning out this element of his oppositional narrative,
Rana offers wonderful examples, including the colonists' response to the
Quebec Act. 53 He sees the American Revolution as a defense of a lost
imperial status quo, and the colonies as the proper successor to British
imperial power.54
Finally, as part of his assessment of American exceptionalism, Rana
retroactively applies the lens of twentieth century writing on the "basic
postcolonial predicament," which scholars of Africa and Asia developed.55 Postcolonial elites centralized power, thus truncating popular
rule. 56 One reason for this is that they were bound within a global economic system that limited substantive independence.5 7 Accordingly, a
good deal of American centralization and executive power can be understood as a now-familiar response to postcolonial independence.5 8
That said, Rana's narrative proposes a version of American exceptionalism that is rightly conceived. The American Revolution was the
first successful settler revolt, and American settler society had distinctive
elements: 59 (1) economic independence as the ethical basis of free citizenship understood as self-rule, which excluded both dependent wage
earners and moneyed interests from the ranks of republicanism; (2) conquest as the engine of freedom, because without new territory, men and
women could not have free labor and economic independence; (3) an
exclusive form of republicanism that divided free and unfree labor; and
(4) the encouragement of immigration and easy naturalization, which
checked xenophobia.6 0 In some cases, like those of Mexicans and
Asians, however, this policy of easy immigration hardened the divide
49 See id. at 44-45.
50 See id. at 20-22.
51 See id. at 24-28.
52

Id. at 93.

53 See id. at 73-79.
54 See id. at 96-97.
55 Id. at 15.
56 See id. at 134.

57 See id.
58

See id. at 15.

59 See id. at
60

12.

See id. at 12-13.
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between insiders and outsiders.6 1 Rana explains this subordination of
immigrants to naturalized citizens in terms of "American republicanism,"
not simply in terms of racism or nativism. 6 2
II.

THE POLITICAL DYNAMIC OF DEMOCRATIC FREEDOM

My second set of observations has to do with the dynamic of progressive politics in The Two Faces ofAmerican Freedom. When I was in
college, I read Frances FitzGerald's America Revised63 on changes in
teaching American history. I thought of it here because it seems to me
that Rana intends his narrative history to be pedagogical and not just an
intervention in professional academic debates. He sees history as ideology and inspiration. He presents his book as a resource for democratic
politics.
Rana reinforces his drive to produce history and theory for use in
democratic politics through his immersion in contemporary political theory. Most importantly, it is a counter to the distance theorists explicitly
impose between regulative ideals and political practice. One dominant
strain of democratic theory today is "deliberative democracy." 64 At least
in its first incarnations, this theory gave pride of place to argument and
reason-giving under restrictive conditions designed to filter out inequalities. Its concerns were in defining the parameters of justification in democracy that could support political agreement, rather than organization,
mobilization, and institutions. Although deliberative democratic theorists have turned their attention increasingly to institutions, their focus is
still on providing reasons and reaching agreement. 65 In contrast, Rana
wants to bring democratic theory back to the dynamics of actual men and
women making political history.
So his history is for us and for use in democratic politics. His
model is the Populists who "embodied the most sustained effort since the
Revolutionary Era to imagine how social conditions could be made compatible with freedom as self-rule." 66 As I see it, he has several tasks.
First, he must disabuse us of the associations we typically have with
Populism, including the foul odor of xenophobia and violence abroad.
Rana does this by pointing to the two faces of settler empire as embodied
61 See id. at 340.
62 See id. at 12-14.
63

See

FRANCES FrrzGERALD, AMERICA REVISED: HISTORY SCHOOLBOOKS IN THE TWEN-

TIETH CENTURY (1979).
64 For a discussion of the theory of deliberative democracy, see generally John Bohman
& WILLIAM REHG, DELIBERATIVE DEMoCRACY: ESSAYS ON REASON AND POLITICS (1997).

65 See id.
66 See RANA, supra note 7, at 177.
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in Tom Watson, and by insisting on recovering the Populist democratic

ambition. 6 7
Second, he aims to set Populists off from Progressives, who are typically the baseline for many historians, political theorists, and constitutional scholars whose project is to understand and encourage democratic
initiatives.68 Rana rejects the Progressive ideal. He argues that for
Progressives, democratic public action through their signature institutions-referenda and initiatives-relied on voting, a form of participation that abstracted from actually existing social groups in conflict. 69 In
the same spirit, he takes the sheen off Herbert Croly, who wanted industrial democracy, but at the same time pressed for representative unionism, not worker control of industry. 70 In support of his rejection of
Progressive models, Rana might have added Progressive confidence in
administration and expertise. Conversely, however, he fails to credit
Progressives with inventing citizen-advocacy groups and informally organized "pressure groups" of all kinds. Indeed, throughout his work it is
unclear (as it often is in contemporary progressive writing) whether Rana
imagines the possibility of one unified popular will. More specifically, it
is unclear how much he derogates alliances among popular interests and
opinions.
Finally, he must show that what Populists wanted has moral appeal.
What does he find compelling? Rana's proposition is clear-the Populists offered a version of inclusive republicanism that broke with earlier
settler exclusiveness.7 1 They identified rural poverty with the problems
of industrial work through labor organizations such as the Farmers Alliance and Knights of Labor. 7 2 Rana even discerns a hint of recognition
among Populists that this unity might extend beyond the producing classes to create an even more comprehensive republicanism. 7 3 Moreover,
Rana states that the Populists offered a unique view of self-rule that valued "direct control by insiders over the sites of political and economic
decision making." 74 They showed the way to self-government, which
goes against the grain of the standard path to political inclusion, which
consists of admitting the representatives of new groups into the political

67
68

See id. at 210.
See, e.g., JAMES T.

KLOPPENBERG, UNCERTAIN VICTORY: SOCIAL DEMOCRACY AND

PROGRESSIVISM IN EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN THOUGHT,
69

See

See
See
72 See
73 See
70
71

74

Id.

RANA,

supra note 7, at 241-42.

id. at 246.
id. at 195-99.
id. at 205-10.
id. at 3.

1870-1920 (1986).
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elite.75 Rana sees the weakness of the Populists as their focus on material and political self-interest to the exclusion of republican virtue.76
Today, he writes, "public life is marked by striking popular uncertainty and a persistent desire for basic change."7 7 He offers the Populists
as a resource-a bit of usable past. Still, two questions remain open
before we share his particular objections to Progressivism and adopt Populism as a model. First, who are the Populists now? Rana concedes that
there is a problem identifying, even aspirationally, "actually mobilized
groups-organized and willing to stand as a government behind the government . . . ."78 I will add that it is equally unclear with whom exactly
contemporary populists should be in social conflict. Still, he gives us a
few hints. As lead actors in a republican revival, Rana assigns a special
place to immigrants. 79 He sees immigration policy as a marker of both
the disintegration of settler empire and of the possibility of reclaiming
the republican project.8 0 The test is whether we transform immigration
from what it has become-the constitutional entrenchment of federal
government authority, embodied in the category "illegal alien"-to a site
of internal republicanism. 8 1
The other open question deals with what I see as ambiguity about
democratic political action. Specifically, Rana seems uncertain about the
priority or relation between informal mobilization and political institutionalization. He speaks repeatedly of permanent mobilization and "parallel institutions." 8 2 He lauds Populists for their resonance with the
extralegal conventions that grew up after colonial independence. 83 His
notion of democracy consists of movements, voluntary associations, and
self-rule, embedded in the civil society from which the forces for government democratization begin. Today, certainly, we have all sorts of extrainstitutional politics-including populist and corporate interest and advocacy groups, and self-styled public interest groups of the right and left.
But I do not read The Two Faces of American Freedom as a strong proposal for democratic localism and derogation of government to association governance. If I am correct that government and federalism remain
necessary and democratically valuable, not just insuperable, where is the
overarching mediating institution-apart from presidents' episodic
75 See RANA, supra note 7, at 205.
76 See id. at 197-98.
77 Id. at 4.
78 See id. at 347.
79 See id. at 346.
80 See id. at 238-39.
81 See id. at 346.
82 See id. at 205-09.
83 See id. at 209-10.

LOST CAUSES

2011]

117

claims that they are responsive to a popular "mandate"-which will
bring these groups together in government?
In short, Rana's history leaves us with the question of the significance of basic democratic institutions-in particular, political parties,
elections, and the partisan organization of government. Here, I am reminded of the 2008 Democratic presidential primary debate between Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton over whether advances in civil rights
owed more to Martin Luther King, Jr., or Lyndon Johnson. 8 4 How important was the Populist Party in Rana's Populist model? Was it significant because it challenged the hegemony of two major parties, or was its
own origin and organization independently important? Was participation
in the Democratic Party co-optation by "shadow populists," or a sober
recognition of how political alliances are built and how ideas and interests can be translated, in a limited way, into policy and law? Can political parties be a site of permanent mobilization-especially in the absence
of strong state and local party organization and patronage (which was a
resource for the early political integration of immigrants)? Today, party
patronage is seen as a signature of corruption. Rana speaks of the "democratic legitimacy" of party, but what is required?85 What are the popular associational bases of parties today? What is the reciprocal shaping
that occurs when populist forces meet parties and the organization of
government?
III.

Two

META-OBSERVATIONS: ETHICS AND HISTORY

One lesson implicit in this work is the powerful ethos of American
political identity. Rana insists that Americans require a collective purpose and achievement, and he locates identity today in the purpose of
security, and the unique historical project of protecting national freedom
and sacrificing for the liberty of other peoples. 86 Americans, he writes
with regret, abandoned self-rule for security at home and global dominance abroad.8 7 He argues that we failed to follow those like Randolph
Bourne, who could imagine non-imperial internationalism. 88 Rana provides us with the genealogy of this "fallen" identity and notes its accompanying moral hubris.89 Given this account of moralized national
purpose, I am struck by the fact that Rana understates the role of religion
in his grand historical narrative. Faith is central, historically and today,
84 See Chuck Raasch, Republicans Miss Opportunity in Clinton-Obama Fight Over Civil
Rights, Race, USA TODAY, Jan. 18, 2008, http://www.usatoday.com/news/opinion/columnist/

raasch/2008-01-18-race-politicsN.htm.
85 See RANA, supra note 7, at 204.
86 See id. at 289-90.
87 See id.

88 See id. at 290-95.
89 See id. at 289-90.
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but it is absent from Rana's narrative. I am not speaking here of episodic
American millennialism or missionary efforts abroad, but of the more
consistent way in which we associate American goodness with faith even
today, and how faith is a force behind the confident exercise of executive
power and public policy.
Several factors lead religion to fuel Americans' moral hubris. Precisely because religious advocacy in the United States today lauds "religion" in general and because a vast majority of Americans are people of
faith, religion reinforces the assumption that Americans are good, and
that their intent is virtuous. 90 Religion also reinforces moral hubris because of the democratic habit of claiming that faith-based politics redounds to the benefit of the nation, rather than to a particular church. 9 1
Religion generates "true believers" in this nation of believers. 92
More speculatively, the eclipse of theology, especially grim doctrines of unredeemable sin, and the infusion of religion with democratic
optimism, may play a part in fanning moral self-certainty. 93 Though religious Jeremiahs see America falling from grace and characterize national trials as punishment for sin, but even here, America can return to
goodness. 94 The right policies, the just war, are redemptive. 95
Concerned democratic theorists propose ways of injecting skepticism and puncturing self-certainty about the rightness of American policy, especially foreign policy. 9 6 But if certainty is not a matter of the
correctness of a policy, but rather of unshakeable confidence in Americans' unique goodness and virtuous intent, skepticism is not much help. 97
Tempering moral hubris is a matter of questioning our own good faith.9 8
The antidote is a genuinely harsh self-discipline; as William Galston insisted, it requires acknowledging that "[w]hile America is an unusually
fortunate nation, it is not a distinctively virtuous nation." 99 Faith in
American politics-from Rana's standpoint, faith in episodic democratic
impulses-may be warranted, but faith in our unerring goodness is not.
Rana's sobering secular narrative gives this element short shrift.
90 See Nancy L. Rosenblum, Faith in America: Political Theory's Logic of Autonomy
and Logic of Congruence, in RELIGION AND DEMOCRACY INAMERICA 404 (Alan Wolfe & Ira

Katznelson eds., 2010).
9' See id.
92 See id.

93 See id. at 404-05.
94 See id. at 405.
95 See id.
96 See Rosenblum, supra note 90, at 405.
97 See id.
98 See id.
99 William Galston, When in Doubt, 5 DEMOCRACY 31, 36 (2007), available at http://

www.democracyjoumal.org/pdf/5/Galston.pdf.
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My final meta-observation, and caveat, has to do with the terms on
which Rana describes settler history and current populist democracy as
offering the present moment as a critical one. He states, "American
politics today is at a crossroads." 10o This is an epochal moment since
"empire, so to speak, has become the master rather than the servant of
freedom."' 0 ' He specifically observes that this warrants the global attention on U.S. politics and policy.1 02 Characterizations of the present as a
critical condition or a turning point are common enough in history and
political theory. If we are not to take this characterization of the present
as a critical moment as just a bit of rhetoric to underscore the work at
hand, how should we understand this propensity? In the context of a
comprehensive history like Rana's, where we have been glued to a narrative arc, the term "crossroads" is not a throwaway. It invokes philosophies of history in which we look back and recognize both how we got to
the point to which we have arrived and its significance. Now we are on
the path to enlightenment; we have the opportunity to replace scarcity
and alienation with abundance and liberation from subjectship to free
citizenship. Alternatively, philosophies of history assert that at this moment, we face an "existential threat to the human species," or we are
entering a grim "post-democratic" era or we are facing solidification of
our imperial identity. It is as if the immensity of present need will evoke
the necessary will for new institutions, new policies, new moral principles, or a new democratic ethos. A sort of enchantment is palpable-as
if the "crossroads" can excite transformation.
Why do we-why does Rana-invoke critical moments? I would
not discount the rhythms of the academic life cycle and state of the field.
Or, more high-mindedly, Rana's invocation of critical moments relates to
the point the philosopher Immanuel Kant made-that the possibility, that
is, the conceivability, of progress provides us with at least a "minor motive for attempting such a philosophical history." 0 3 Critical moments
could also provide consolation that the worst decline is a possible occasion for something better to arise. Still, Rana is not extravagantly epochal; he is comparatively restrained in situating this moment in
historical time: the concept of "crossroads" is not apocalyptic. Certainly,
his historical perspective on where we stand now is better than the truncated timeline of democratic politics that news and election cycles present. Nonetheless, the notion of ordinary "political time," the framework

100 See RANA, supra note 7, at 3.
101 See id. at 4.
102 See id. at 1.
103 IMMANUEL KAwr, Idea for a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Point of View, in
On
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of political compromise and incremental improvement, is better. '0

This

returns me to the question I raised about Rana's populist democratic
model-what agents, with which institutions, can make some headway
against which forces, on behalf of democratic self-government today?
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For a discussion of the theory of political time, see
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